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Abstrat
We approah the virtual reality phenomenon by studying
its relationship to set theory. This relationship provides a
haraterization of virtual reality in set theoreti terms,
and we investigate the ase where this is done using the
wellfoundedness property of sets. Our hypothesis is that
non-wellfounded sets (so-alled hypersets) give rise to a
dierent quality of virtual reality than do familiar
wellfounded sets. We initially provide an alternative
approah to virtual reality based on Sommerho's idea of
rst and seond order self-awareness, and then introdue
a representation of rst and seond order self-awareness
through sets, assuming that these sets, whih we all
events, originally form a olletion of wellfounded sets.
Consequently, strong virtual reality haraterizes virtual
reality environments whih have the limited apaity to
reate only events assoiated with wellfounded sets. In
ontrast, the more general onept of weak virtual reality
haraterizes olletions of virtual reality mediated events
altogether forming an entirety larger than any olletion
of wellfounded sets. Azel's hyperset theory indiates that
this denition is not empty, beause hypersets enompass
wellfounded sets already. Moreover, we speially argue
that weak virtual reality ould be realized in human history
through ontinued progress in omputer tehnology.
Finally, we formulate a more general framework, and use
Baltag's Strutural Theory of Sets (STS) to show that
within this general hyperset theory Sommerho's rst and
seond order self-awareness as well as both onepts of
virtual reality admit a self-onsistent representation.
Several examples and heuristi arguments are given.

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Introdution
Virtual reality has beome a popular metaphor for a
variety of aspets in ontemporary media ulture, in-
luding tehnologial, sienti, eonomi, philosophi
and even religious aspets [17, 11℄. The tehnologial
aspet, however, is genuine beause an attempt to re-
ate virtual reality is usually seen as the output of some
direted engineering proess.
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In reent years, notie-
able tehnologial progress has been made in this eld,
mainly driven by the high rate at whih modern om-
puter tehnology has evolved. Computer hardware,
software and human-omputer interfaes are nowadays
the leading advanes behind this phenomenon [17, 19℄,
and within a relatively short period of time they have
reahed a standard high enough to make virtual real-
ity a popular tehnology. For example in the enter-
tainment industry, where omputer generated games
have arrived at a level of sophistiation in terms of
their visual, aousti and even mehanial expression
unthinkable only a few deades ago [13℄. Addition-
ally, the fast growth of the Internet has lead to a new
form of virtual reality devies, often alled eletroni
ommunities or virtual playgrounds [26, 27℄, in whih
many human operators an partiipate simultaneously
in a digitally designed and interative environment pro-
vided by omputer networks [7℄. Apart from enter-
tainment and rereation, virtual reality tehnology has
found appliations in military tehnology [15, 16℄, in
1
Here, we will not disuss possible onditions and eets as
indued, for example, through intoxiation, abrosia or medita-
tion.
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mediine [24℄, or in arhitetural design [25℄ and engi-
neering [10℄.
Virtual reality devies an be haraterized as those
whih through adapted tehnology establish an inter-
ation with the human senses [17℄, e.g. with the vi-
sual, aousti, mehanial and olfatory senses, and
the quality of a realized virtual reality environment
then depends on how good, or how bad, this inter-
ation is aomplished on a tehnial level. In order
to systematially desribe this interation, three es-
sential quality indiators of virtual reality have been
proposed [22, 11, 9℄: (a) Presene. Presene is the
sense of physially being in an environment. It an be
thought of as the experiene of one's physial environ-
ment; it does not refer to one's surroundings as they
exist in the physial world, but to the pereption of
those surroundings as mediated by both automati and
ontrolled mental proesses. (b) Immersion (or, vivid-
ness). Immersion means the representational rihness
of a mediated environment as dened by formal fea-
tures, that is, the way whih an environment presents
information to the senses. () Interativity. This qual-
ity refers to the degree to whih users of virtual reality
medium an inuene the form or the ontent of the
mediated environment.
Any high quality virtual reality has to meet these
quality indiators, and so we surmise that the essene
of virtual reality is losely related to eah one them.
And even though virtual reality is often haraterized as
a phenomenon ontained in omputer tehnology, this
relation reveals that it has to omply with our ognitive
ability to onsiously pereive both ourselves and the
external world that surrounds us.
Sine the ongoing tehnologial development in hu-
man history resembles an evolutionary proess, we an
ask what developmental stages virtual reality teh-
nology ould reah. For instane, are there possible
stages of onvergene? Convergene in this ontext
would mean that at some (future) time any further
progress of virtual reality tehnology would not lead
to a signiant improvement in its quality. At present
times we ould still be far from suh a stage, but we
should aknowledge that the rate at whih new devel-
opments of virtual reality related tehnology are pre-
sented has aelerated sine the introdution of om-
puters. This situation exemplies that even though
omputer-generated virtual reality still is a reent ul-
tural ahievement, and therefore we may still qualify
it as primitive, we should nevertheless reognize it as
a rapidly emerging tehnology whih possibly holds a
potential to inuene and to hange human life and
ulture eetively [14, 17, 11℄.
Starting from these preliminary onsiderations, our
aim is to establish and to disuss a relationship between
a distint model of human onsiousness and set theory
in order to extend our understanding of virtual reality
as a tehnologial and ultural phenomenon. In parti-
ular, we want to show that virtual reality, onsiousness
and so-alled non-wellfounded set theory are intimately
related.
Non-wellfounded set theories naturally enlarge las-
sial, i.e. well-founded, set theory in that they intro-
due new strutures, alled hypersets (also referred to
as non-wellfounded sets in mathematial terms) whih,
due to their irular membership struture, annot be
represented in any onventional set theory, e.g. in
the ommon Zermelo-Fraenkel-Axiom of Choie (ZFC)
set theory. In ontrast to wellfounded sets, hyper-
sets an be thought of olletions ontaining an in-
nite hierarhy of membership. Speially, we may
depit a hyperset a by an innite sequene of sym-
bols fa 3 b 3  3 : : :g, or by a irular sequene
fa 3 b 3  3 ag. In wellfounded set theories, like in
ZFC set theory, suh strutures are exluded by the
Axiom of Foundation, whih is one of the Zermelo-
Fraenkel axioms stating that the membership hierarhy
must be nite. We see that hypersets use the member-
ship relation 2 in a irular manner|a dening hara-
ter that makes hypersets well suited to analyze irular
strutures or reursive situations.
As an example illustrating the dierene between
wellfounded and non-wellfounded objets, onsider the
ase of bibliographial referenes in publiations, suh
as sholarly artiles. Normally, if a bibliographial ref-
erene is made in an artile a
3
to a seond publiation
a
2
, then it follows that a
2
was published before a
3
. In
turn, the artile a
2
ould also refer to a third text, a
1
,
this one published even before a
2
. This situation an be
2
given by a nested membership relation between three
wellfounded sets: a
3
3 a
2
3 a
1
. However, through
widespread ommuniation over the Internet and do-
ument storage and retrieval on the World Wide Web
this normal hronologial order, i.e. the wellfounded-
ness of bibliographial referenes, ould be distorted.
So-alled Internet preprint servers nowadays allow au-
thors to exhange manusripts prior to editorial review
and publiation, so that a irular situation an form
where artile a
1
itself ontains a bibliographial note
pointing bak to a
3
, for instane. As a onsequene,
a publiation of all three manusripts would lead to a
irular membership, a
3
3 a
2
3 a
1
3 a
3
, i.e a non-
wellfounded struture.
2
Hyperset theories have been formulated on rm
mathematial foundations [4, 1, 5℄, and hypersets
themselves have been suessfully applied in elds suh
as omputer siene, linguistis and philosophy [3℄.
But so far they have not yet been identied as in-
dispensable strutures in our apaity to onsiously
experiene the physial world. However, we feel that
preluding hypersets as elements of onsious experi-
ene inluding physial experiene arbitrarily onnes
its meaning by suppressing ontingent eets that vir-
tual reality tehnology might have on onsious expe-
riene in the rst plae. One of our goals is therefore
to investigate the idea of non-wellfounded objets real-
ized in virtual reality environments, and in this ontext
we will argue that omputer tehnology may indeed de-
liver suh environments. But there appear also formal
reasons why hypersets may beome useful for studying
the interplay between human onsiousness and virtual
reality. As will be demonstrated in the last setion of
this work, two elementary qualities of onsiousness
an be represented in terms of modal logi, i.e. in
terms of a non-lassial logi that introdues modali-
ties of propositions suh as neessity and possibility. In
turn, through the mathematial results of A. Baltag,
modal logi an be applied readily to onstrut a gen-
eral set theory, referred to as the Strutural Theory of
2
This example was taken from a reent study by R. Rousseau
and M. Thelwallon [18℄, where irular arrangements of hyper-
links between hypertexts were frequently found on the World
Wide Web.
Sets [2℄, whih naturally enompasses both sets and
hypersets, thus generalizing lassial set theories suh
as ZFC. In this approah, we address the onsious-
ness problem by employing a model developed by G.
Sommerho [20℄, in whih the `elementary qualities'
in question beome the ategories of rst and seond
order self-awareness dened in terms of so-alled inter-
nal representations [20, 21℄. These denitions put us
in the position to draw a formal relationship between
hyperset theory and onsiousness.
With suh a relationship at hand, we may also de-
sribe reality as a olletion of internal representations
of the surrounding physial world, where every repre-
sentation is mapped onto a set. Suh mapping lends
itself to lassify the elements of onsious experiene,
whih we all events, depending on the presene or the
absene of wellfoundedness. That is, an event may
either be assoiated with a wellfounded set or with
a non-wellfounded set (hyperset). To be meaningful,
however, suh a lassiation of onsious experiene
in terms of sets must be given in a plausible and non-
arbitrary manner.
We address this problem by putting forward the hy-
pothesis that events are assoiated exlusively with
wellfounded sets originally. Our premise is that on-
sious experiene of the physial world during history
before the development of virtual reality tehnology is
adequately desribed by wellfounded sets. This is un-
derstood as referene to times in human history when
the ognitive piture of the physial world was not
signiantly inuened or altered by tehnial devies,
sine at those times tehnology itself had not grown
enough to exert suh an inuene. Only quite reently
virtual reality tehnology has began to realize its po-
tential and to interat with the elements of onsious
physial experiene. Rheingold [17℄ gives numerous
historial referenes to identify the original beginning
and the following growth of what he alls a symbio-
sis between virtual reality tehnology and human ul-
ture. He onludes that the development of virtual
reality tehnology has been intertwined with the evo-
lution of human ulture for many thousand years, thus
dating bak to the very beginnings of human expres-
sion through arts, entertainment and religion. This
3
onatenation raises the possibility that virtual real-
ity tehnology is immanently human [17, 11℄, in whih
ase it would be diÆult to identify any epoh when vir-
tual reality tehnology was nonexistent. We aknowl-
edge this alternative and require that the interation at
those ages in history should be small enough in terms
of widespread implementation of virtual reality teh-
nology in human soiety. As indiated earlier, during
the seond half of the twentieth and throughout the
beginning of the twenty-rst entury implementation
of virtual reality tehnology has been driven by the
rapid development of omputers. We therefore refer
to times before this reent development to indiate
the original status when events were assoiated with
wellfounded sets.
This premise given, we are proposing that the in-
teration of onsious experiene with virtual reality
tehnology may happen in two distint modes. In a rst
mode, whih we all strong virtual reality, virtual reality
devies may generate events that during tehnologial
evolution reah higher tehnial levels and thus simu-
late with inreasing quality events assoiated with the
physial world. For example, we may think of ontem-
porary tehnology suh as head-mounted-displays and
data-gloves whih visually and mehanially simulate
natural environments as parts of the physial world.
Although suh devies may reah high standards, they
are limited to reate events represented by wellfounded
sets, and so they always share{albeit in an abstrat
sense{a quality with the events of the original physial
environment whih they atually simulate. Despite its
reent progress, we argue that the status quo of virtual
reality tehnology still an be haraterized as strong
virtual reality. However, rapid tehnologial advane
opens another possibility, where this haraterization
may hange to a seond mode|weak virtual reality.
In weak virtual reality, modern tehnial devies suh
as omputers additionally reate a new lass of events,
the latter whih are mapped onto non-wellfounded
sets. Contrary to the original events assoiated with
wellfounded sets, those events ease to have equal nat-
ural ounterparts in the original physial world. Math-
ematially, this situation is expressed by the fat that
the totality (that is the set-universe or, simply, the
universe) of wellfounded sets is a proper sublass of
the totality of all hypersets (alled the hyperuniverse).
This idea suggests that virtual reality may eventually
onfront us with an unpreedented quality of human
experiene. Our aim is to oneptually motivate, to
introdue and to explain both modes of virtual reality.
This paper is organized as follows. In the rst two
setions, Setion 1 and Setion 2, we oneptually pre-
pare and subsequently dene strong virtual reality. As
indiated, this onept employs a desription of on-
siousness based on Sommerho's approah to the
onsiousness problem [20℄. Strong virtual reality in-
volves a set-theoreti desription of what Sommerho
alls rst and seond order self-awareness [20, 21℄. A-
ording to Sommerho, these two ategories are intro-
dued as internal subjetive representations neessary
for onsious experiene. Strong virtual reality pre-
sumes that the struture of our experiene, i.e. the
struture of all events represented by rst order self-
awareness, beomes a universe for Zermelo-Fraenkel-
Axiom of Choie set theory. This implies that any ex-
periene we ould gain from a strong virtual reality
always is onsistent with ZFC, or, in simpler terms,
it means that any strong virtual reality annot be the
soure of any experiene struturally riher than the
original physial world.
The next setion, Setion 3.1, introdues weak vir-
tual reality. It struturally extends the rst onept
in that now the totality of events in virtual reality be-
omes larger than any olletion of events reated with
strong virtual reality. A onsious subjet having an
impression of weak virtual reality would therefore per-
eive the latter as a struture riher than her original
reality assoiated with ZFC set theory. The remainder
of this setion is dediated to the question whether
this denition is meaningful. First, this question is
disussed theoretially by giving referene to Azel's
onstrution of a non-wellfounded set theory. The lat-
ter, referred to as ZFC
 
+AFA set theory, is realized
through the Anti-Foundation-Axiom (AFA) whih re-
plaes the Axiom of Foundation in Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory. Then Azel's relative onsisteny result
guarantees that there is a set-theoretial embedding
of any universe for ZF (or for ZFC) within a larger uni-
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verse for ZFC
 
+AFA. Thus, with the help of Azel's
onstrution of a universe for ZFC
 
+AFA, we obtain
a andidate for the totality of events in weak virtual re-
ality. But without further assumptions about rst and
seond order self-awareness a onlusion on the mean-
ingfulness of our denition annot be drawn immedi-
ately. We address this point again in the forthoming
setion, Setion 3.2, but this time giving heuristi ar-
guments why eventually the development of omputer
tehnology may lead to weak virtual reality, and by dis-
ussing an example motivated by the artisti work of
M.C. Esher.
In Setion 4 we return to a theoretial onsideration
of the relationship between Sommerho's approah to
onsiousness and non-wellfounded set theory. We in-
trodue some ideas of Baltag's Strutural Theory of
Sets (STS) [2℄, a general non-wellfounded set theory
whih inludes Azel's ZFC
 
+AFA as a speial ase.
This set theory is used as a framework for studying the
above relationship, and we demonstrate why STS is
a proper mathematial tool for studying the very on-
ept of strong and weak virtual reality on the basis of
Sommerho's ideas. This approah bridges ognitive
and mathematial aspets, and so it onveys a more
oherent piture of strong and weak virtual reality in
terms of non-wellfounded set theory.
1 Reality, virtual reality and on-
siousness
Our immediate goal is to provide an abstrat but, for
our purposes, useful desription of reality itself. We
will then use this desription in order to formulate a
onept of virtual reality that takes into aount a on-
siousness model developed by Sommerho.
We desribe reality a lass R
0
, equipped with a va-
riety of onsious subjets eah being a sublass of
R
0
. Without loss of generality, we an for now assume
that there is only one suh onsious subjet S. The
environment of a onsious subjet is its lass omple-
ment whih we all the world of S, and we denote it
as W
0
= R
0
nS. By the self of an onsious subjet we
again mean the lass S. We observe that the self and
its environment are not introdued as separated enti-
ties that exist independently of eah other, but rather
as mutually determining and omplementary lasses of
a unied reality: S does not exist without W
0
, and
vie versa. Moreover, we expet this mutual deter-
minism to be essential for any proper understanding of
the term `onsious', whih so far has been used only
as an unspeied attribute of the subjet S. This un-
derstanding should eventually allow us to point out a
relationship between the faulty of onsiousness, hy-
perset theory and virtual reality, as mentioned in the
introdution setion. But as there exists a vast variety
of approahes to the onsiousness problem, how an
we hoose one that would help to meet our goals?
To make a hoie, we initially take a moderate posi-
tion and look for a haraterization of onsiousness
being semantially broad enough to enompass the
three onstitutive qualities of virtual reality, i.e. pres-
ene, immersion and interativity with the world. We
thus do not require suh a haraterization to provide
us immediately with a relationship to sets or to hy-
persets. Instead, it should at least reognize the mu-
tual determinism between the onsious subjet and
the surrounding world in terms of these three qualities.
Sine all three obviously require higher ognitive fun-
tions, suh a haraterization is diÆult with so-alled
`bottom-up' approahes to onsiousness. Typially,
a bottom-up approah initially fouses on the proper-
ties of individual brain ells, their reations and inter-
ations, their biohemial or biophysial properties, or
their information proessing apabilities. Higher ogni-
tive funtions are here expeted to be detetable only
after studying the onerted ation of many brain ells,
suh as neurons. Hene, a bottom-up approah to on-
siousness usually does not identify higher ognitive
funtions in the rst plae, and it may even be ques-
tionable whether it an reah this goal without having
a detailed denition of higher ognitive funtions at
hand [12℄. On the other side, a `top-down' approah
aknowledges from the beginning the existene of er-
tain higher ognitive funtions neessary for onsious
experiene. Moreover, these funtions are formulated
as indispensable harateristis of onsiousness seen
as a whole system, whih enompasses the subjet as
5
well as the subjet's environment. After dening these
harateristis, a top-down approah would investigate
the question of how they are realized in organisms that
experiene onsiousness, and thus it prepares an ex-
ploration of the living orrelates of onsious experi-
ene [12℄.
A `top-down' approah has been given by Sommer-
ho in his book \Life, Brain, and Consiousness"[20℄.
His work's oneptual basis is the identiation of the
subjet's internal representations whih he understands
as the primary higher ognitive funtions of onsious-
ness [20, 12, 21℄. Our intention is to use these rep-
resentations for a denition of virtual reality whih ex-
pliitly aounts for our ognitive ability to be, to per-
eive and to interat with and within the world. Hene,
we adopt Sommerho's systemi desription of on-
siousness ([20℄, page 90) by requiring the following
two ategories of representations, i.e. higher ognitive
funtions.
1. First order self-awareness. A omprehensive and
oherent internal representation of the world and
the self-in-the-world. Representations of this kind
we also all events.
2. Seond order self-awareness. Representations
whih represent the ourrene of a representation
of the rst ategory as being part of the urrent
state of the self.
With the words of Sommerho, then, the faulty of
onsiousness is desribed as a power of a subjet to
form internal representations of ategory (1) and of
ategory (2) ([20℄, page 91).
We are going to give three immediate omments on
these ategories. First, sine this haraterization of
onsiousness requires the faulty of a onsious sub-
jet S to generate some internal representations, it
presupposes that S possesses an internal struture be-
ing able to onstantly monitor the world and to register
the ourrene of events. No further statements about
the nature of suh an internal struture responsible for
this ability will be made in the remainder of this artile;
Sommerho addresses this issue with the important
onept of a subjet being in a state of expetany
([20℄, page 67) for an event, but for our present dis-
ussion, as we are going to show, this onept is not
immediately relevant. Seond, representations of the
rst and seond kind do not ontain representations
of merely possible objets, events et., as these are
the elements of the subjet's imagination. Sommer-
ho argues that the latter ategory is ertainly ne-
essary for proesses suh as thought, but it is not a
neessary ondition for what we mean by being on-
sious about the world, the self-in-the-world and about
events. We adopt his opinion, and hene for our deni-
tions of (strong and weak) virtual reality we will exlude
any diret referene to representations of objets of
imagination. Third, for our preliminary understanding
of virtual reality given in this setion it is not nees-
sary to involve spei assumptions about seond order
self-awareness. So, we presume here the existene of
representations that register the ourrene of events,
i.e. seond order representations, without making this
presumption expliit in our preliminary denition of vir-
tual reality. This situation will hange in Setion 4,
when we will mathematially express representations
of the rst and the seond ategory expressed through
the modal language of the so-alled Strutural Theory
of Sets, a hyperset theory.
The two harateristis of the rst ategory, om-
prehension and oherene, we an identify in terms
of the two qualitative onstituents of virtual reality,
namely presene and interativity. A omprehensive
representation of the world and the self-in-the-world
by a subjet presupposes that this subjet, who is a
self at the same time, exhibits a sense of being in the
world, but this is what presene means in the virtual re-
ality ontext. On the other hand, interativity in virtual
reality requires for a onsious subjet that the ation
and its response arried out between the subjet and
its environment as well as the ation and the response
arried out between the subjet and the self-in-the-
environment develop what we all a sense-making re-
lationship; for example, this sense-making interdepen-
deny an be attributed to subjetive loality, ausal-
ity and determinism. In this sense atio and reatio
must form a oherent relationship within the internal
representation of the subjet. Otherwise, oherene,
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and therefore interation, would get lost if ation and
reation would be unorrelated in the internal repre-
sentation of the beholder. We stress at this point that
although omprehension and oherene will not admit
an expliit mathematial meaning in our approah, im-
posed qualities like loality, ausality and determinism
may hange this situation. This stems from the fat
that the latter an be expressed in mathematial terms
quite naturally. However, these arguments will be elab-
orated elsewhere. The remaining quality of virtual re-
ality, immersion, is impliitly present in the represen-
tation ategory (1), sine this statement presupposes
the existene of multi-sensory stimulus that suÆiently
overs the sensory apparatus of the onsious subjet
in order to maintain the impression of (virtual) real-
ity. Without suh suÆient overage of senses, pres-
ene and interativity would get lost, too. Thus we
have made plausible that our simple model of reality
R
0
equipped with the subjet S and the world W
0
may
qualitatively be oneived a virtual reality. This is not
surprising, for our own physial world, whih an be
seen as a realization of R
0
, meets all three qualitative
onstituents of virtual reality at a high level. In sum-
mary, these onsiderations motivate a rst attempt for
a denition of virtual reality.
Denition 1.1 Let R
1
be a proper sublass of R
0
with
R
1
\ S = S. Then fR
1
; Sg is a virtual reality for
a onsious subjet S if S forms representations of
ategory (1) and of ategory (2) when W
0
is replaed
with W
1
= R
1
n S.
This denition implies that internal representations, re-
alized as the subjet's higher ognitive funtions, natu-
rally inorporate the dening qualities of virtual reality.
It is therefore a reformulation of the dening quali-
ties of virtual reality in terms of the dening qualities
of onsious experiene on the bakground of Som-
merho's ideas. Yet our attempt still is preliminary
beause it fails to make any diret statement about
the struture of onsious experiene as a whole, and
so it laks immediate pratial use when it omes to
analyzing the strutural rihness of virtual reality.
2 Events and strong virtual reality
The goal of this setion is to give a more spei vari-
ant of the previous denition|one that determines the
totality of events that a subjet may experiene in a vir-
tual reality environment. To reah it, we rst introdue
the basi elements of onsious experiene as sets. Let
S be again a onsious subjet, then a representation
of the rst ategory, whih we refer to as an event E
0
,
enodes two onurrent types of assoiations between
elements of the world and the self-in-the-world. There
is the assoiation with a ertain sublass P  W
0
of
the world established through the internal representa-
tion of the world, and|through the omnipresent rep-
resentation of the own self-in-the-world|there is also
the assoiation of P with the self S. We represent both
assoiations with one symbol E
0
(P; S), and further pre-
sume that an event E
0
(P; S) always forms a lass for
a given onsious subjet S and a given lass P in
the world. Conurrently, seond order self-awareness
of an event E
0
(P; S), i.e. a representation of ate-
gory (2), is given through the symbol E

0
(P; S). Thus
E

0
(P; S) again is a lass and it enodes the our-
rene of an event E
0
(P; S), referred to as a seond
order event (Conversely, we may all events `rst order
events' but we will use the short form `event' through-
out this work.). To illustrate this situation, imagine
the event E
0
(P; S) of onsiously looking at a physi-
al objet, then the objet beomes the lass P here,
the latter being a proper part of the subjet's physi-
al world, while E

0
(P; S) represents the seond order
event that registers the event of looking at the objet.
It is then natural to postulate that every onsious
subjet S has the ability to represent a whole olletion
of events, and we assign the symbol V
0
to this olle-
tion. Now we make the following assumption about
the struture of V
0
.
Assumption 1 For a given reality R
0
and a onsious
subjet S the olletion V
0
of all events is a universe
for ZFC set theory.
By a universe for ZFC set theory we mean a olle-
tion V
0
of sets that is a modelM of ZFC set theory, i.e.
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a realization of the axioms in ZFC set theory by means
of ordinary sets. Here, Assumption 1 beomes essen-
tial for our further onsiderations beause it manifests
the nature of the representations of the rst ategory.
This assumption also represents a spei referene
to historial times in ultural history when virtual re-
ality tehnology was still undeveloped, as explained in
the introdution setion. But speifying the totality
of events as a universe for ZFC set theory is still ar-
bitrary at this stage, beause we have not explained
why events should be understood as wellfounded sets
in ZFC set theory. We address this problem and justify
Assumption 1 in Setion 3.2, but for now we use it
without further explanation as a referene point in our
lassiation of virtual reality.
Let dom(V
0
)  R
0
be the domain of the universe
V
0
, that is the union of all lasses P  R
0
that give
rise to events E
0
(P; S). We hoose a sublass ofW
1

dom(V
0
) suh that R
1
= W
1
[S is a virtual reality in the
sense of Denition 1.1, and thus we denote, in analogy
to the olletion V
0
, as V
1
the olletion of all events
E
1
(P; S) with P  W
1
. Equipped with this notation
we are ready to introdue the onept of strong virtual
reality.
Denition 2.1 Let R
1
 dom(V
0
) [ S be a lass with
R
1
\ S = S. Then the tuple fR
1
; S; V
1
g is a strong
virtual reality for a onsious subjet S if fR
1
; Sg is a
virtual reality with V
1
 V
0
.
This denition haraterizes all those virtual realities
whose olletions of events are embedded within the
universe V
0
for ZFC. Strong virtual reality may thus
be oneived as a virtual reality that emerged from
a part of the subjet's original world with the addi-
tion that the events it mediates beome onsistent
with the subjet's universe V
0
. In this sense, a sub-
jet S would never experiene a strong virtual reality
as struturally riher than the subjet's original uni-
verse V
0
. For example, we may think of strong virtual
reality in terms of reent advanes in tehnology where
high-resolution displays, head-mounted-displays, head-
phones, data-gloves as well as properly designed soft-
ware are used to proess the information ux through
the sensory interfae [19℄; together they aim to onili-
ate presene, immersion and interativity{although still
at rather low quality. Hene, it is permissible to las-
sify today's virtual reality tehnology as an early form
of strong virtual reality, i.e. as a tehnology driven
strong virtual reality that is now emerging in human
ulture.
We additionally remark that the above denition is
general in that it does not speify the events to whih
it refers, exept that it requires all events to be mapped
onto wellfounded sets. Therefore two dierent virtual
reality environments, i.e. two that present a very dif-
ferent ontent or that are based upon dierent teh-
nologies, may turn out to be quite similar, as sets or as
lasses, in strong virtual reality, beause this denition
neither does ditate tehnial design nor the presented
ontent.
3 Weak virtual reality
3.1 Weak virtual reality and Azel's non-
wellfounded set theory
We give a more general statement to Denition 2.1,
whih extends the olletion of virtual reality reated
events.
Denition 3.1 Let R
1
 dom(V
0
) [ S be a lass with
R
1
\S = S. Then fR
1
;

V
1
; Sg is a weak virtual reality
for a onsious subjet S if fR
1
; Sg is a virtual reality,
and if V
0


V
1
for any universe V
0
for ZFC set theory.
In ontrast to strong virtual reality, a realized weak
virtual reality would have dramati onsequenes for
a onsious subjet S, beause the olletion of on-
sious events formed from this kind of virtual reality
would be a riher struture than the subjet's origi-
nal universe, or, in logial terms:

V
1
strongly implies
V
0
. Hene, in this environment the subjet ould ex-
periene something that might be by intuition alled
a reality shift from V
0
to

V
1
. This argumentation,
however, is insuÆient beause we annot know yet in
what sense events are assoiated with non-wellfounded
sets at all, and to what extent the mathematial dif-
ferene between wellfounded and non-wellfounded sets
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should result in a orresponding dierene of the sub-
jet's ognitive experiene. Both problems will be ad-
dressed throughout the remainder of this work.
Before addressing these problems, we want to exam-
ine the question whether this denition is mathemati-
ally meaningful at all. And, indeed, non-wellfounded
set theory suggests that the onept of weak virtual
reality is not meaningless, beause a universe for non-
wellfounded set theory exists whih already ontains
any universe for ZFC. We follow a well-known and intu-
itive approah to non-wellfounded set theory [1, 5℄, and
introdue the so-alled Anti-Foundation-Axiom (AFA)
whih will replae the Axiom of Foundation in ZFC
set theory, i.e the axiom saying that the relation 2 is
wellfounded. The resulting non-wellfounded set the-
ory establishes a one-to-one orrespondene between
graphs (the pointed, direted graphs in fat) and sets
via AFA. It therefore an be seen as the soure of a
logially weaker and thus mathematially broader on-
ept of set. For that reason that we use the term weak
virtual reality.
Let G = fN;Eg be a direted graph, where N is the
set of nodes and E is the set of edges all being ordered
pairs of nodes. For (x; y) 2 E we write x ! y ; in that
ase x is a parent of y and y is a hild of x . A path
in G is a nite or innite sequene of nodes, eah of
whih (exept the rst) is a hild of its predeessor. If
there is a path from node x
1
to node x
k
, we say that
x
k
is an desendant of x
1
. A direted graph is said
to be pointed if there is a unique node x
0
(the root
of the graph) suh that all other nodes are desen-
dants of x
0
. From now on we always mean a direted,
pointed graph when we simply write `graph'. The Anti-
Foundation Axiom then reads as: Every graph depits
exatly one set (AFA). This axiom gives rise to the
existene of non-wellfounded sets, suh as sets formed
from graphs having loops of edges (irular sets) or
from graphs with an innite number of edges in a path,
and these 'sets' annot be onstruted in ZFC set the-
ory. If we replae the Axiom of Foundation with the
Anti-Foundation Axiom in ZFC set theory we obtain a
olletion of axioms whih we denote as ZFC
 
+AFA
set theory. The immediate question then is whether
the set theory ZFC
 
+AFA is relatively onsistent with
regard to the original ZFC set theory, i.e. if there is a
model of M of ZFC set theory that is a submodel of
ZFC
 
+AFA set theory. The next Theorem makes a
lear statement about that.
Theorem 3.1 [Azel's relative onsisteny result℄ If
V
0
is a universe for ZFC set theory, then there is a
universe V

for ZFC
 
+AFA suh that V
0
 V

.
The proof, originally given in [1℄, is guided by two
questions: \When are two sets pitured by the same
graph?" and \When do two graphs piture the same
set?". We want to sketh the main points of the proof.
A system is a generalization of the onept of a graph
in the sense that the olletions of nodes and direted
edges may now be proper lasses also. Any system M
is required to satisfy the requirement that, for eah
node x , the olletion h
M
(x) = fx
0
2 x jx ! x
0
g of
all hildren is a set. Clearly, any graph is a system.
A system map  : M ! M
0
between two systems M
and M
0
is a map suh that for all x 2 M,  maps the
hildren of x inM onto the hildren of (x) inM
0
; i.e.,
for all x 2 M it is h
M
0
((x)) = f(y)jy 2 h
M
(x)g.
As its main point, the proof of Theorem 3.1 provides a
anonial surjetive system map  : V ! V

, where V
is any system onsistent with ZF set theory without the
Axiom of Foundation (whih we denote as ZF
 
), and
where V

is a lass whih turns out to be a omplete
system. Given a systemM, anM-deoration of a graph
G is just a system map 
d
: G ! M. A omplete
system is a system M suh that every graph has a
unique M-deoration. Sine it then an be shown that
every omplete system is a model of ZFC
 
as well as
that every omplete system is a model of AFA at the
same time, it follows that the system map  establishes
a anonial embedding of V
0
in V

, whih ompletes
the proof.
Bringing bak our attention to the notion of weak
virtual reality, we thus have the following result imme-
diately.
Corollary 3.1 Let fR
1
; S; V
1
g be a strong virtual real-
ity. Then there is a anonial system map  : V
1
!

V
1
suh that V
1
 V
0


V
1
. Moreover,

V
1
is a universe
for ZFC
 
+AFA set theory.
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For any given strong virtual reality, there is a larger
universe for ZFC
 
+AFA that is relatively onsistent
to V
1
, i.e. V
1
 V
0


V
1
, whih indeed suggests that
Denition 3.1 is mathematially meaningful. Then,
as already indiated, the next task is to demonstrate
whether or not

V
1
allows for a olletion of events,
i.e. whether or not the elements of

V
1
are representa-
tions of ategory (1) and ategory (2) for a onsious
subjet S. However, this question annot be answered
satisfatory unless additional information is provided
about the struture of the universes V
1
and

V
1
along
with their members, i.e. their respetive events. Suh
information espeially onerns a suitable mathemati-
al representation of the internal state of the onsious
subjet S, and further, how events may hange the in-
ternal state. The notion `hange' implies that there
is a temporal metaphor within, and thus one may ask
whether some proess governs the subjet's state and
possibly auses a transition from V
1
to

V
1
, i.e. a tran-
sition from strong into weak virtual reality.
3.2 Heuristi arguments
Having introdued strong virtual reality and weak vir-
tual reality as rather formal entities, our next aim is to
disuss the evidene that both are relevant and pra-
tial onepts for studying the relationship between
human ognition and virtual reality tehnology. We
want to bring forward the idea that in weak virtual
reality physial objets may be represented as non-
wellfounded strutures|something that ontroverts
our everyday understanding of physial matter. Con-
versely, the aforementioned transition from strong to
weak virtual reality ould be aomplished by a tehni-
al realization of events that are assoiated with non-
wellfounded objets in the virtual reality world. We
begin with a general outline of this idea and disuss an
example thereafter.
Our physial world onsists of material objets that
nd a sientially valid desription among physial
theories and mathematial strutures onsistent with
our physial experiene. And physial experiene itself
is gained through sienti experiments and through
our everyday life in the world of physial phenomena.
In a ommon understanding, physial objets are spa-
tially limited strutures in a three-dimensional geomet-
rial spae, i.e. in the physial spae. Additionally,
these objets are equipped with ertain measures suh
as mass, harge or angular momentum.
3
Sine this
understanding implies that physial spae is a topolog-
ial spae to whih physial objets belong as sets, they
must omply with an often unexpressed or even ignored
ondition: No physial objet an be a proper part of
itself. Clearly, this means that we annot split an ex-
tended and material physial objet into several parts,
so that the latter beome physial objets again, and
then realize that one part is idential with the orig-
inal objet before the split. All physial objets are
expeted to follow this ondition for otherwise ontra-
ditions would our even at the elementary level of set
theory. And from a ertain standpoint this onern is
justied, for in wellfounded set theories, like in set the-
ories based on the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, any set a
having a proper subset b  a suh that :(a  b) with
a = b must be disregarded, beause any two sets a and
b are equal if their members are equal (aording to the
Axiom of Extensionality) from whih follows a = a, a
ontradition to :(a  a). Sine set theory is seen as
the basi mathematial theory desribing the struture
of olletions, and so it an be utilized to represent any
olletion of physial objets, ontraditions at this el-
ementary level are to be avoided right away.
4
At the
same time, however, a ontraditory situation an be
the soure of a deeper understanding for it prompts us
to srutinize our basi assumptions.
Let us briey reall the urrent role of wellfounded
set theory in the physial sienes. During the his-
tory of modern physis, set theory has largely been left
unnotied as a remote eld in pure mathematis, and
set theory itself has impliitly been equated with well-
founded (ZFC) set theory. Non-wellfounded set the-
ories, although formulated rigorously as early as 1926
[8℄, have not reeived any ontinuous attention in the
physial sienes. But suh a restrition to wellfounded
3
Suh measures exist in lassial and in quantum physis.
4
Moreover, any violation of the ondition that no physial
objet an be a part or a member of itself would immediately
dissent mass and energy onservation, for example.
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sets has onurrently plaed the physial sienes in a
ertain situation or, dierently put, within a ertain
ontext. Within suh ontext, the above onstrut a
annot be a mathematial struture `set', and there-
fore it annot funtion as a sientially valid model of
a physial objet either. Again, this tells us that in the
hosen ontext of wellfounded set theories and notably
on the bakground of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory no
physial objet an be a proper part of itself if we want
to antiipate obvious ontraditions. This observation
brings out a reason why modern physial theories so
far have limited themselves to mathematial strutures
like sets, groups, algebras, et., that without exep-
tion are onsistent with ZFC set theory. The reason is
that non-wellfounded set theories have not been on-
sidered physial. Consequently, a universe V
0
for ZFC
set theory ontaining wellfounded sets only appears to
be a legitimate desription for the entirety of rst or-
der internal representations of the physial world in this
ontext. Indeed, this argument reovers our statement
given in Assumption 1. It thus haraterizes the ur-
rent situation in whih all physial objets are expeted
to be wellfounded. But is this situation neessarily per-
manent?
To approah this question, we use an example given
in Fig. 1. It shows the famous lithograph of M.C.
Esher titled \Asending and Desending". As many
of Esher's graphial works it pitures a situation on-
sidered impossible in the physial world. In this pi-
ture, a stairase is shown onneting four levels in a
building. To follow the stairs represented in the sene,
we may begin our way from the oor loated at the
left-hand-side of the piture{it is the orner with a
two-story tower. From here a desent is possible, i.e.
a way downstairs towards the ground. After making
three more suh desends, and after passing three more
oors, something unfamiliar happens. Even though a
way down has always been hosen, and so an arrival
at a lower level somewhere beneath the starting point
has been expeted, the way has brought us bak to
the little tower|our starting point. But this must be
impossible in physial spae if the latter is understood
as three-dimensional Eulidean spae and if the em-
bedded building is onsidered a rigid material objet.
Figure 1: M. C. Esher's lithograph \Asending and
Desending" (1960). The pitured stairase on the
top of the building is often haraterized as `impossible'
beause of its irular struture. In weak virtual reality
suh onstrution is oneivable as part of a subjet's
world. Copyright M.C. Esher Foundation.
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We may illustrate this situation using wellfounded set
theory. For this purpose we represent eah of the four
oors by members of the set fs
0
; s
1
; s
2
; s
3
g, and fur-
ther assume that eah member is a set s
i
= fs
i 1
g with
i 2 Z=4Z(i.e., i is an element of the yli group of
order 4), so that the proess of desending from, say,
oor `s
1
= fs
0
g' to oor `s
0
' is the membership relation
between s
1
and s
0
, viz. s
1
3 s
0
. Hene, by making four
onseutive desents we obtain the nested struture
s
3
3 s
2
3 s
1
3 s
0
3 s
3
, whih|in ontradition to our
assumption|annot represent a set s
3
in wellfounded
set theory beause it implies an innite hierarhy of
membership, i.e. a non-wellfounded struture. This
example again shows that in general geometri self-
referene and irularity as aspets of physial objets
annot be desribed within wellfounded set theory.
From a mathematial point of view, events assoi-
ated with non-wellfounded objets do not ause dif-
ulties if we allow to shift our ontext from well-
founded to non-wellfounded set theory. For example,
in ZFC
 
+AFA set theory we an resolve the ontra-
dition aused by introduing self-referential strutures
as sets. In the above ase, the struture s
3
3 s
2
3
s
1
3 s
0
3 s
3
learly depits a non-wellfounded set in
ZFC
 
+AFA.
We see that despite the problems it auses in well-
founded set theory, Esher's piture gives a very lear
impression of the represented sene, with high level of
detail and with tehnial nesse|qualities that make it
familiar and onrete despite its abstrat strangeness.
And from this standpoint we may go one step further
and suggest an experiment, in whih this speial sene
is presented to a human subjet immersed in an virtual
reality environment. The experiment would doument
the subjet's response to this situation, and two dis-
tint outomes are oneivable. Either a negative re-
sult, i.e. the subjet would not signiantly develop
presene, immersion and interativity with the pre-
sented environment and would thus pereive the visual
stimulus simply a plain piture representing a titious
sene (Fig. 1). Or a positive result, upon whih the
subjet would experiene presene, immersion and in-
terativity at a level where an internal representation of
the stairase in Esher's \Asending and Desending"
would beome an event assoiated with a physial ob-
jet in the subjet's world.
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We stress, however, that
for suh a level to be reahed virtual reality tehnology
would have to be fairly advaned, i.e. a ertain tehno-
logial standard would have to beome available in or-
der to ondut our hypothetial experiment. We think
that omputer tehnology may provide suh a stan-
dard, and rst attempts exist that put `impossible ob-
jets' into omputer generated virtual reality environ-
ments. For example, in the projet \Esher revisited in
VR valley" [6℄ several of Esher's graphial works have
been transformed into animated omputer graphis.
Continuous spatial motion in three dimensions and so-
phistiated light eets have been added to the original
senes, and, in omparison to Esher's originals, the re-
sulting virtual reality quality of the omputer generated
senes has inreased. Given this progress, we expet
that tehnologial evolution will ontinue to rene sim-
ulations of `impossible' objets and senes that inlude
non-wellfounded strutures. This advanement may
eventually lead to a positive result of our suggested
experiment, doumenting the subjet's ability to on-
eive new and unpreedented events assoiated with a
non-wellfounded sets represented in virtual reality envi-
ronments. Evidently, suh result would doument the
subjetive transition into weak virtual reality.
4 Strutural Theory of Sets as a
general approah and onlud-
ing remarks
In this work, we began our investigation of the rela-
tionship between onsiousness, virtual reality and hy-
persets by formulating the dening qualities of virtual
reality in terms of Sommerho's rst and seond or-
der self-awareness. We have then taken this formula-
tion to dene strong and weak virtual reality, and gave
initial theoretial and heuristi arguments for why we
think that weak virtual reality an be reated with non-
wellfounded objets realized within virtual reality envi-
5
We do not require suh an experiment to be onduted using
exlusively one of Esher's works, of ourse.
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ronments. We now return to our initial point by show-
ing that in turn non-wellfounded set theory an devise
rst and seond order self-awareness in pure logial
terms. Also, we are going to demonstrate that strong
and weak virtual reality admit a representation within
a general non-wellfounded set theory, the Strutural
Set Theory, whih ontains Azel's non-wellfounded
set theory as a speial ase. This step indiates that
onsiousness, weak virtual reality and hypersets an
be put into one oherent theoretial framework.
Baltag has developed a general axiomati set theory,
the Strutural Theory of Sets{STS [2℄, formulated in
sentenes of modal logi, i.e. in terms of a modal lan-
guage generated by three logial rules (see Appendix
setion): negation, onjuntion and unfolding. Modal
logi itself is a generalization of lassial binary logi
as the former introdues two propositional modalities,
referred to as neessity and possibility, whereas the lat-
ter does not make suh a distintion and treats all
valid propositions as neessary. The onnetion be-
tween modal logi and sets is established through so-
alled satisfation axioms, whih guarantee that under
reasonable onditions a modal sentene is represented
(satised) by a set. Hene modal sentenes are seen
as statements about sets that an be satised by sets,
and hypersets in partiular are satised by sentenes
inluding innite logial onjuntions.
One result of STS is the existene of a universal
set U, whih ontains all sets satised by valid modal
desriptions, and th(U), alled the modal theory of
U, denotes the olletion of these desriptions. Sine
the universal set has members that are wellfounded
and non-wellfound sets, we propose U for entirety of
events of a onsious subjet S so that th(U) beomes
the theory of U for the subjet S, i.e. th
S
(U). As a
onsequene, STS oers here a diret onnetion to
rst and seond order events: Suppose E is a set in
U, satised by a modal desription ' 2 th
S
(U), and
assoiated with an event of rst order self-awareness.
Then the unfolding rule says that there is another valid
sentene, ' 2 th
S
(U), now apturing the information
that U has a member desribed by '. In turn, the
desription ' is satised by a set E

, yet another
member of the universal set U, and so the set E

an
be identied as a (seond order) event assoiated with
seond order self-awareness. This observation justies
our representation of events through sets as given in
Setion 2, and it an be summarized in the following
proposition (A more detailed outline of our argument
together with a brief introdution to STS is given in
the Appendix.)
Proposition 4.1 (a) Sommerho's terms of rst and
seond order self-awareness an be represented in
modal language. (b) First and seond order events
in strong and in weak virtual reality an be represented
in STS as sets that satisfy onsistent (innitary) modal
sentenes in th
S
(U).
We have laimed that set theory provides a reason-
able framework for studying strong and weak virtual re-
ality. This laim is now further supported by the above
proposition whih speies a mathematial form for the
entirety of onsious events, inluding rst and seond
order self-awareness, in one non-wellfounded set: the
universal set U in STS.
Yet several unexplored diretions remain, and one
is the problem of identifying those modal desriptions
whih would result in oherent internal representations
of the world and the self-in-the-world. As we have
argued, only these peuliar events mediate presene,
immersion and interativity, and there is no reason to
believe why all modal desriptions should lead to on-
sious events. We have briey mentioned in Setion
1 that loality, ausality and determinism may be ne-
essary qualities, but at this stage it not quite obvi-
ous how to integrate these qualities into our proposed
framework.
Another diretion regards the potential inuene
of virtual reality tehnology on the physial sienes.
Sine virtual reality devies may not only have the a-
paity to simulate the original physial world in strong
virtual reality, but also to transend it in the ontext
of weak virtual reality, ritial questions about the si-
enti harater of physial experiene in the light of
virtual reality should follow. For example, is it imag-
inable that physial laws, i.e. the basi onditions of
physial phenomena as urrently known in siene, will
13
at some point beome largely arbitrary as virtual real-
ity tehnology|a tehnology ontrolled by humans|
develops further? It appears that we annot analyze
suh a provoative question with sienti srutiny un-
til we have explored further the sienti onditions
and impliations of onsious experiene.
A Appendix
We employ a generalization of ZFC
 
+AFA set theory
and follow the original work of Baltag [2℄, in whih a
strutural onept of sets is introdued, and we briey
outline some of the elementary ideas in STS. A stru-
tural understanding of sets is in a sense dual to the
lassial iterative (i.e., syntheti) onept of set. While
in the latter we onsider sets as built from some pre-
viously given objets in suessive stages (the iterative
onept of set), the former presupposes that a priori a
set is a unied totality that reveals its abstrat mem-
bership struture only step by step through the proess
of strutural unfolding. This stepwise disovery of the
set struture is generated by imposing questions (whih
Baltag alls analytial experiments) to the initial ob-
jet; the answers to these questions are the stages of
strutural unfolding. Thus at eah stage we have a par-
tial desription of the objet onsidered. The unfolding
proess an be dened by reursion on the ordinals: for
every ordinal  and every set a, the unfolding of rank
 is the set a

, given by:
a
+1
= fb

: b 2 ag
a

= ha

i
<
, for limit ordinals,
Surely, this denition is meaningful for all wellfounded
sets, but for a larger universe it is inappropriate in gen-
eral sine 2-reursion is equivalent to the Axiom of
Foundation.
To nd a denition of strutural unfolding for more
general objets, i.e. systems or lasses, Baltag takes
seriously the fat that at every ordinal stage we an
only have a partial desription of a system. An es-
sential ingredient here is the observational equivalene
between systems { a generalization of the bisimulation
onept for systems [1, 5℄. In fat, bisimulations do
not have an answer to the question \When do two
systems (sets) depit the same set (system)?" when-
ever large systems are onsidered, i.e. whenever those
systems fail to be graphs. On the ontrary, observa-
tional equivalene is given by modal equivalene, and
not by the usual denition of bisimulation, and it turns
out that with innitary modal logi observational equiv-
alene between systems an be dened to inorporate
even large systems or lasses.
In STS, a modal theory th(a) for every set or lass a
is given through the so-alled satisfation axioms, and
before we quote these axioms we may rst introdue
the underlying modal language.
1. Negation. Given a possible desription ' and an
objet a, we onstrut a new desription :', to
apture the information that ' does not desribe
a.
2. Conjuntion. Given a set  of desriptions of the
objet a, we aumulate all desriptions in  by
forming their onjuntion
∧
.
3. Unfolding. Given a desription ' of some mem-
ber (or members)of a set a, we unfold the set by
onstruting a desription ', whih aptures the
information that a has some member desribed by
'.
The language generated by these three rules is alled
innitary modal logi whih allows innite onjun-
tions. With
∨
and  as the duals (obtained by substi-
tuting ^ 7! _ and  7! ) to
∧
and , respetively,
we an introdue the following other operators:
 =: f' : ' 2 g ;
 =: f' : ' 2 g ;
' ^  =:
∧
f'; g ;
' _  =:
∨
f'; g ;
4 =:
∧
 ^
∨
 :
The satisfation axioms presume the existene of a
lass a Sat, eah element of Sat is a pair of a set a and
a modal sentene '. Writing a j= ' for (a; ') 2 Sat,
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these axioms read as
(SA1) a j= :' i a 6j= '
(SA2) a j=
∧
 i a
0
j= ' for all ' 2 
(SA3) a j= ' i a
0
j= ' for some a
0
2 a
With this setting the notion of unfolding of a set a
admits now an expression through modal sentenes '

a
dened for any ardinal  as
'
+1
a
=: 4f'

b
: b 2 ag ;
'

a
=:
∧
f'

a
:  < g for limit ardinals;  :
Unfoldings of rank  are maximal from an informa-
tional point of view as they gather all the information
that is available at stage  about a set and its mem-
bers. In formal language this statement reads as the
proposition: b j= '

a
i b

= a

. This explains the
notion of observationally equivalent: two sets, lasses
or systems are said to be observationally equivalent if
they satisfy the same innitary modal sentenes, i.e.
if they are modally equivalent. In STS, the existene
of sets is guaranteed by the bijetion th() between
maximal weakly onsistent theories and the sets (This
orrespondene is an immediate onsequene of the
Super-Antifoundation Axiom in STS.). Weakly on-
sistent theories are those theories in whih all sub-
olletions of desriptions that are satised by a set
are losed under innitary onjuntions. It follows that
non-wellfounded sets or lasses are exatly those whih
do not admit satisfation by any nite onjuntion in
innitary modal logi.
On this bakground, we now make the observa-
tion that STS|onstruted on the basis of innitary
modal logi| provides a tool to reformulate our de-
sription of Sommerho's rst order and seond order
self-awareness. First of all, a universal set U exists in
STS being observationally equivalent to the universal
lass U

= fx : x is a setg. We want to use U as the
olletion of all events E
1
in weak virtual reality. This is
possible beause it an be shown that any universe

V
1
for ZFC
 
+AFA set theory is observationally equiva-
lent to the set U [2℄. This suggests that a weak virtual
reality fR
1
; U; Sg an be dened within STS as well.
To see this, onsider any arbitrary event E
1
(P; S) 2 U
assoiated with its modal desription ' 2 th(U), i.e.
E
1
(P; S) j= ', then events themselves may be un-
derstood as modal desriptions mediating rst order
self-awareness.
The theory th(U) is formulated in the innitary
modal language of the subjet S, thus we write
th
S
(U) = th(V
0
) to aount for this dependene on
the presene of a onsious subjet S. Any event
E
1
(P; S) 2 U is then understood as the image of
P  W
1
under the map d := th
S
Æ th
 1
S
, i.e.
E
1
(P; S) = d(P ) = th
 1
S
(th
S
(P )), with th
S
being the
operator mapping lasses P  W
1
onto their modal
theories and th
 1
S
is the inverse map; both maps ex-
ist in STS [2℄ and together they dene the denota-
tion funtion d := th Æ th
 1
with d : R
1
! U. In
that manner rst order self-awareness are mathemat-
ially represented by the denotation d . And seond
order self-awareness is established here onurrently
through the unfolding rule, i.e. rule (3), as ' now
enodes the information that U has a member de-
sribed by '. But ' as a sentene is a member
of th
S
(U), beause th
S
(U) already ontains the ol-
letion f' : ' is a onsistent modal senteneg [2℄.
Then th
 1
S
(') must be a member of U, and we iden-
tify it as th
 1
S
(') = E

1
(P; S). The latter state-
ment learly resembles seond order self-awareness as
desribed in Setion 2.1. Finally, sine rule (1) and
rule (2) are satised, i.e. they reognize the fat that
modal desriptions of events an be logially ombined
to reate valid desriptions of sets again, Proposition
4.1 follows.
We note that the speial ase of strong virtual reality
is obtained by using a denotation d whih maps lasses
in R
1
onto wellfounded sets. These sets altogether
omprise the totality of events in strong virtual reality
V
1
. In that ase the orresponding theory is th
S
(V
1
) 
th
S
(U).
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